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**HISPANICS IN MASSACHUSETTS  
A DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS**

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
Hispanic Chair  
**DR. YOHEL CAMAYD-FREIXAS**



**HISPANICS IN MASSACHUSETTS:**  
**A DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS**

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August 1986



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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Massachusetts Commission on Hispanic Affairs gratefully acknowledges the efforts of the team of Commissioners, staff and interns who conducted the research and developed this report. We are particularly grateful to Dr. Yohel Camayd-Freixas Hispanic Chairperson of the Commission who provided valuable direction for this research and acted as principal editor and for his permission to use in this report many analyses from his study Hispanics in Lawrence: A Demographic Analysis (December 1985). To Mayra Rodriguez-Howard and Ralph Rivera, past and present Directors of the Commission, Research Analyst Elizabeth Strom, and student interns Carla J. Alonso, Francisco Urbina and Alberto Villar who researched much of the data and contributed to the analyses and policy recommendations. Norma I. Colon and James J. Callahan provided valuable assistance in the editing and printing of the report. We gratefully acknowledge the consultation, support and ideas provided by Dr. Leobardo Estrada of the Graduate School of Architecture and Urban Planning at UCLA, and want to thank Commission member Dr. Raquel Bauman for the cover design.

Special thanks to Senator Royal L. Bolling, Sr. and his staff for allowing the Commission to use their office and for their general support.

Finally, we are grateful to Rosa M. Colon for her excellent word processing work, and to La Alianza Hispana, Inc. for donating the computer time to prepare this report.

## FOREWORD

In Massachusetts, recognition of the presence of Hispanics as a significant segment of the population has come slowly. As immigration patterns have shifted away from traditional entry points such as New York City, Hispanics have become more dispersed throughout the Northeast region; states such as Massachusetts have offered promise of a more tranquil environment and better work opportunities to Latinos dissatisfied with New York City as well as those from abroad. As the Commonwealth's Hispanic population has grown to be the twelfth largest in the country, the barriers that prevent this group from enjoying the economic and social opportunities available in this state have become more evident. If these barriers are not soon removed, Hispanics are likely to become an entrenched underclass in Massachusetts society.

It is to prevent such a development that the Massachusetts Commission on Hispanic Affairs has undertaken its task of documenting the needs and concerns of this population. Not only is the well-being of roughly 4% of the state's residents of humanitarian concern, but the economic future of the Commonwealth may depend on its success in socially and economically mainstreaming this fastest-growing segment of its population. The descendants of early twentieth century European immigrants have grown older, many moving away, leaving the young and growing Hispanic population an increasingly important segment of the labor force. In some cities and towns, Latinos comprise a major consumer market whose economic prosperity--or hardship--will determine the health of their local communities. For the sake of our cities and the surrounding areas that depend on them, as well as for the Latino community itself, we must address the obstacles that impede Hispanics' progress in filling the jobs and leadership positions in which they are needed.

The purpose of the Massachusetts Commission on Hispanic Affairs, in addition to documenting problems and needs of Hispanics in Massachusetts, is to assist the Legislature, the Governor and policy-makers in formulating plans that will bring our Latino community into the social and economic mainstream of Massachusetts. The report that follows is one of a series of analytical documents currently in preparation which address the areas of migration and population, education, employment and training, housing, health, human services, community economic development, and the special needs of Hispanic youth.

Respectfully submitted,

Royal L. Bolling  
Senator Royal L. Bolling, Sr.  
Senate Chairman

Kevin W. Fitzgerald  
Rep. Kevin W. Fitzgerald  
House Chairman

Yohel Camayd Freixas  
Dr. Yohel Camayd Freixas  
Hispanic Chairman

## BACKGROUND

### The Massachusetts Commission on Hispanic Affairs

In the early 1980's, Senator Royal L. Bolling, Sr. (D-Boston) recognized the situation faced by the Hispanic community in Massachusetts. He was able to perceive a fast-growing minority group which was disenfranchised from the political and economic mainstream of the Commonwealth. Believing that it was important to address the needs and concerns of this population so that future generations of Latinos did not have to confront the same conditions, Senator Bolling sponsored legislation creating the Massachusetts Commission on Hispanic Affairs. This legislation called for the Commission to initiate an inquiry into the needs of the Commonwealth's Latino population.

The House leadership appointed Representative Kevin W. Fitzgerald (D-Jamaica Plain/Mission Hill) as the Commission's House Chairman based on his concern and demonstrated commitment to the Hispanic community. Dr. Yohel Camayd-Freixas (Boston) is the Hispanic Chairman. The other Commission members are: Dr. Raquel Bauman (Worcester), Representative Kevin P. Blanchette (D-Lawrence), Senator Linda Melconian (D-Springfield), Nelson Merced (Boston), Mike Rivas, Jr. (Springfield) and Cesar A. Ruiz (Cambridge/Somerville).

The staff of the Commission consists of Ralph Rivera (Director), James J. Callahan (Legislative Analyst), and Norma I. Colon (Administrative Assistant). In addition, the Commission has been assisted by summer staff and graduate interns. To support the work of the staff, the Commission developed statewide task forces of experts in the areas of community economic development, education, employment and training, health, housing, human services and youth. The Commission also held public hearings in six cities with large concentrations of Hispanics: Boston, Chelsea, Holyoke, Lawrence, Springfield and Worcester.

The report that follows is the result of collaboration among Commission members, staff, task force members and the Latino community across the state. We welcome your comments and continued support.

**NOTE:** The terms "Hispanic" and "Latino" will be used interchangeably throughout this report to refer to people of Puerto Rican, Dominican, Cuban, and Mexican ancestry as well as other Spanish-speaking people from Central and South American countries.

\*Section 20 of Chapter 297 of the Acts of 1983.



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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This demographic analysis of the Hispanic community in Massachusetts was developed as a means of providing planners in human service and community development organizations, as well as government officials and others, with the information necessary for program planning and policy formulation. The report focuses on two areas. The first is population trends: both those of the past decade and projections for trends of the future. The second is the demographic character of the Hispanic community in Massachusetts and some of the policy implications that are suggested by these analyses.

### 1. POPULATION TRENDS

#### The National Perspective

It is well known that Hispanics in the U.S. are growing at a rapid pace--over three times faster than Blacks and over ten times faster than Whites. This serves as the basis for the common prediction that Hispanics will become the largest minority group in the U.S. within our lifetime. Three factors account for this growth: fertility, age, and immigration. Hispanics are growing rapidly on all counts.

- Hispanic women bear an average of three to four children each, a rate almost identical to the fertility of White women during the baby boom of the 1940's and 1950's. The fertility of White women today is much lower (1.8 children per woman).
- The median age of Hispanic women (22 years) puts them at the beginning of the peak child-bearing years. The median age of White women (34 years), on the other hand, shows that the majority are past child-bearing years.
- While accurate immigration figures are difficult to come by, it is clear that immigrants continue to enter this country from all parts of Latin America. Migration from Puerto Rico also augments the Hispanic population in the continental U.S.

#### Massachusetts

Trends in Massachusetts are consistent with national

patterns. In fact, Hispanic growth in Massachusetts between 1970 and 1980 was nearly twice the national rate; this is over eleven times faster than Whites and five times faster than Blacks.

- In 1980 there were 141,580 Hispanics in the Commonwealth, representing 2.5% of the total population. The estimated 1985 Hispanic population is 222,000, or 3.8% of the state's total population.
- While Blacks outnumber Hispanics in Boston, statewide there are almost as many Hispanics as Blacks. Hispanics are the largest minority group outside of Boston, and outnumber Blacks about 1.6 to 1. It is likely that there will be about as many Hispanics as Blacks in Massachusetts by 1990.

Given the size and growth of this population it is important to begin to systematically gather more information and to develop the necessary mechanisms for planning and policy development.

--Efforts should be directed at creating the mechanisms for generating reliable data on Hispanics (e.g., vital and health statistics).

--Offices of Hispanic affairs should be created in the major departments and offices of state government dealing with the Hispanic community (e.g., Communities and Development, Human Services, Economic Affairs, Mental Health, Social Services, Health, Youth, Education).

--Support should be provided to Hispanic planning and research organizations (e.g., Hispanic Office of Planning and Evaluation) to conduct studies on Hispanic issues that will inform public debate and decision-making.

## 2. POPULATION PROFILE

### National Origins

Massachusetts' Hispanics are mostly from the Caribbean basin, although there is representation from over a dozen Hispanic countries.

- Fifty-three percent are Puerto Rican, 5.5% Mexicans, and 5% are Cuban.
- The remaining 36%, characterized in the Census as "other Hispanics," are primarily

from the Dominican Republic and to a lesser extent from Central and South America.

#### Age Distribution

The Hispanic population is young, containing many families with young children. Conversely, the White population is aging and has proportionately fewer young families.

- The median age for Hispanics is 21.3 years; for Whites it is 31.9 years.
- Thirty-eight percent of Hispanics are under the age of 16 and only 3% are over 65; 22% of White are under 16 and 13% are senior citizens.
- The typical Hispanic family has children under 18, and 42% of all Hispanic families have children under six. Less than 20% of White families have pre-school aged children.
- Thirty-six percent of Hispanic families are headed by single women.

The preponderance of families containing young children and headed by women in the Massachusetts Hispanic community suggests several policy issues:

--Hispanic women will have greater prenatal and other childbirth-related medical needs than other woman. As a subset of this, greater prenatal care and preventive care are needed in the health area.

--Hispanic families will require day care services, including bilingual day care.

--Public education will continue to be a priority for Hispanics.

--The availability of the services sought by single-parent households, such as day care, after-school programs, or counseling, is crucial to the well-being of Hispanic families.

#### Educational Attainment

The 1980 Census showed that in Massachusetts Hispanic adults had the lowest level of formal educational attainment.

- Only 12% of Hispanic adults in Massachusetts are college graduates.
- Some 56% of Hispanic young adults have left school without a high school degree.

The educational system must respond to the needs of Hispanics, both in and out of school:

--Grade promotion and school drop-out patterns among Hispanic public school youth should be studied and remedial programs instituted.

--Bilingual education and ESL are important aspects of public education in Massachusetts, ensuring that Hispanic children receive the same educational opportunities as their English-speaking peers.

--Skills training programs for adults must consider their clients' lack of formal education. Often basic literacy must be included in job-training curricula.

--Pre-school education programs must be strengthened to foster cognitive development and readiness of Hispanic children.

--Youth programs across the board which support school retention, grade promotion and learning must be encouraged.

#### Housing

Hispanics in Massachusetts are primarily renters (78%) and often live in dilapidated, overcrowded structures. Shabby, overcrowded housing for this young population can have a deleterious effect on the physical and emotional development of children. It also discourages residential stability. Policy needs include:

--Formation of local housing courts in cities with large Hispanic populations and low rates of available rental housing.

--Development of community development corporations within the Hispanic community to promote home ownership programs, housing rehabilitation and construction for low income families.

--The increase of housing alternatives in general to reduce growing and improve housing conditions.

#### Language Usage

Hispanics in Massachusetts are largely a first

generation immigrant group which retains its native Spanish language.

- Fifty-eight percent of the Hispanic population is somewhat bilingual in English and Spanish, and 22.3% speak no English at all.
- Older adults are less likely to speak English, although 13.9% of those aged 14 to 24 also speak no English. Given the number of immigrants in the population, most children come from households where Spanish is the primary language.

Inability to speak English presents a barrier to Hispanics seeking services, jobs, and housing, as well as to children within the public school system. Local institutions must therefore develop the capacity to serve the Spanish-speaking population, and efforts to teach English to adults and children must extend beyond the traditional classroom.

**--Transitional bilingual education programs must exist for school-aged children, with continued support for them once they have entered the mainstream classroom.**

**--Bilingual tutorial education programs are needed to supplement efforts by public schools.**

**--ESL and bilingual job training programs should be extended for out-of-school youth and adults, to promote their marketability and reduce social isolation.**

**--Human and social services must be provided by bilingual staff.**

**--Public information materials must be available in Spanish.**

### Citizenship

A high percentage of Hispanics in Massachusetts are citizens and therefore eligible to vote, yet voter registration remains low.

- The majority of Hispanics in Massachusetts (82%) are U.S. citizens; 9.4% of all Hispanics are naturalized, and the remainder are citizens by birth.
- Hispanic U.S. citizens include the entire Puerto Rican population, and 62.6% of the non-Puerto Ricans.

--Hispanic voter registration must be encouraged, both through grassroots efforts by community organizations and by streamlining local registration procedures to facilitate Hispanic participation.

### Residential Stability

Residential stability is an indicator of the extent to which a group is rooted in an area. While Massachusetts contains many newly-arrived Hispanics, it appears that Hispanics who come to Massachusetts are making it a permanent home. This is likely to promote both population growth and community development.

- In 1980, one-third of the Massachusetts Hispanic population had resided in the same county for at least five years, and one-third had been living in the same house since at least 1975.
- Over eleven percent had moved to Massachusetts from elsewhere in the country, and 16.3% were recently arrived from outside the continental U.S., indicating that immigration continues to be an important factor.

### Employment

Many Hispanics migrate to Massachusetts to pursue employment opportunities. Yet many cannot find work and those who are employed are stuck in low-paying jobs in the secondary sector of the economy with little opportunity for mobility. Actually, the Hispanic unemployment situation deteriorated during 1984 relative to both the nation and within Massachusetts. This threatens to make Hispanics a permanent underclass in the Commonwealth.

- The labor force participation rate for Hispanics (57.6%) is less than that of Whites (64.8%), and Latino unemployment is more than three times as common as White unemployment. In 1984, the unemployment rate of Hispanics was 16.4%, compared to 4.6% for Whites.

The employment data on Hispanics suggest several policy recommendations:

--There is a need to expand vocational training, ESL, and job-related support services, ideally in collaboration with local industries, and "retool" Hispanic workers.

--Employment and training opportunities must be increased to provide job access and support job retention.

--The restructuring of the Massachusetts economy suggests the need to re-orient job training for Hispanics from old growth sectors to producer services and high-tech sectors, and to those areas of the service sector that promise employment stability and opportunities for advancement.

--Relevant state departments should jointly develop a policy task force on Hispanic employment and economic well-being.

#### Industrial and Occupational Distribution

The industrial and occupational structure of Hispanics follows predictable patterns. Most Hispanics are employed in low-wage positions and in unstable industries. Average earnings in some of these areas are not much higher than the minimum wage.

- Most employed Hispanics work in manufacturing (41.3%) generally as machine operators and assemblers; or in service industries (30.2%).
- Less than 3% are technicians and only 5% are in management.

--Protections for workers in low-paying jobs must be maintained.

--A great deal of research is necessary to understand Hispanic patterns of occupational entry, concentration and mobility in Massachusetts, and to begin to identify ways of assisting this population to join the occupational mainstream of the communities where they reside.

--Given the overconcentration of Hispanics in manufacturing and certain occupations in Massachusetts, it is important to analyze the relationship between organized labor and Hispanic workers.

#### Income and Poverty

Hispanics in Massachusetts comprise a poor working class community with lower family incomes than those of any other group in the state.

Many more Hispanic families than White families are below the poverty level (36.4% to 6.3%).

- In spite of their somewhat similar labor force participation patterns noted above, Hispanic families earn about half of what

White families earn.

- Female-headed Hispanic families are particularly disadvantaged, earning 49 cents to every dollar earned by Hispanic two-parent families, and 42 cents to every dollar earned by White female-headed families.
- In 1980, the Hispanic poverty rate in Massachusetts (37.6%) was more than four and a half times greater than that of Whites (8.1%). Yet, Hispanics were only 2.4 times as likely to be receiving public assistance. Hispanics have been especially hard hit by Federal Budget cuts since 1980, and the poverty rate has increased.

In some ways, poverty is a symptom of the employment and educational disadvantages discussed above. Yet there are many public initiatives that can ameliorate the hardships faced by the poor:

--A major public education effort should be launched by the Department of Public Welfare and Department of Social Services to inform Hispanic families of their eligibility for benefits.

--Similarly, outreach by bilingual staff is needed to encourage Hispanics to utilize human services.

--Funders of human service organizations should contract with existing Hispanic service providers, and both increase their service range and provide funding stability to these organizations.

--More small business development efforts are needed to promote jobs and improve economic enclaving in Hispanic communities.

--Further study and policy initiatives are needed to promote the relationship between Hispanic small business and community economic development.

### Political Participation

As was previously indicated, 82% of Massachusetts' Hispanics are U.S. citizens, but Hispanic political participation in the state has never been high.

- Low participation can in part be attributed to the youthfulness of the population. Forty-two percent of the population is under 18 and therefore ineligible to vote. Furthermore, those in

the 18 to 24 category, while eligible to vote, do so less frequently than their elders across all races.

However, elected officials and community leaders cannot sit back and wait for changing demographics to alter the level of Hispanic political participation.

--Visible voter registration campaigns must bring the voting issue to Hispanics in their homes, their community centers and commercial areas.

--Hispanic leaders should be appointed to local election commissions, which often have no Hispanic representatives, and Hispanics should be deputized to register eligible voters.

--Local organizations should incorporate Hispanics into their boards to encourage Latino representation in city-wide institutions. This will enable such organizations to be more responsive to the Hispanic community, and will also develop the expertise of Hispanic leadership.

--More leadership development opportunities are needed for Hispanic youth and adults.

--It is necessary to study and better understand the characteristics of election structures and the impact of such structures on facilitating or inhibiting Hispanic political participation.



## INTRODUCTION

Massachusetts has been slow to recognize the presence of Hispanics as a significant segment of its population but, in fact, the state has the twelfth largest Latino population in the United States, and one of the fastest rates of growth in the nation. While the New York metropolitan area is thought of as the dominant center of Hispanic concentration on the East Coast, the past decades has seen an increasing dispersal of Hispanics, primarily those from Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba, into Connecticut and Massachusetts, giving way to the formation of new Hispanic communities.

Massachusetts has traditionally been home to immigrant groups. Irish, Italian, and Portuguese immigrants, just to name a few, have established communities throughout the state. Yet, the waves of immigration that brought these Europeans to the U.S. peaked at the start of the twentieth century. Today's newcomers to Massachusetts are more likely to come from Asia or Latin America. The vigor of these current migration trends, and the relative youthfulness of the in-movers, portend a dynamic growth in the proportion of the state's population originating in these parts of the world.

The Massachusetts Commission on Hispanic Affairs has undertaken this descriptive analysis to establish a statistical portrait of the Hispanic community and to highlight the growing importance of that community to the state of Massachusetts. This report consists of two parts. The first, Population Trends, discusses the size, location, and rate of growth of the Hispanic population nationally and statewide. This part includes projections for Massachusetts population growth through 1990, and concludes with an analysis of why the Hispanic population has grown and will continue to grow rapidly. Part Two, Population Profile, offers a description of the Hispanic population based on such characteristics as national origin, education, income, employment status and family composition.

Of course, such statistical descriptions cannot paint a very full portrait of a community. Hispanics, who trace their origins to points throughout South and Central America and the Caribbean, form a diverse group that shares distinct linguistic and cultural characteristics. Yet, while some Hispanics have lived in the continental United States for several generations, many are newcomers and share the disadvantages often suffered by immigrants and minorities in a new country. It is by documenting some of these characteristics that we hope to enable policy makers, service providers and planners to become better acquainted with a segment of the population that will play a significant role in the state's future. Those interested in the application

of these data to the specific areas of education, community economic development, housing, employment and training, health, human services, and to the needs of youth should refer to the reports of these respective task forces. The references listed at the end of this report also offer additional information.

## PART ONE:

### POPULATION TRENDS

The major population trends to consider in the Hispanic case are (1) population size, (2) population growth, and (3) movement and settlement patterns (i.e., kinematics). These population elements are discussed in the pages that follow at two different levels: the national and Massachusetts perspectives.

#### The National Perspective


The rapid growth of the Hispanic population in cities throughout Massachusetts reflects a national trend. Due to both continued immigration<sup>1</sup> and high birth rates, Hispanics have become the fastest-growing minority group in the country. There were just over nine million Hispanics living in this country in 1970; by 1980 the Census counted 14,608,673, or over 60% more. Growing annually<sup>2</sup> at an average rate of 6.1% between 1970 and 1980, and expected to grow at an annualized 6.8% per year this decade (see Exhibit 1), this population is increasing far more rapidly than the White population (which increased 1.1% annually between 1970 and 1980) or the Black population (which grew 1.8% annually during that period). This growth rate, which is over three times that of Blacks and over ten times that of Whites, serves as the basis for the common prediction that Hispanics will become the largest minority group in the U.S. by the turn of the century (see, for example, Diaz, 1984). Indeed, the trends depicted in Exhibit 1 suggest that there will be

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<sup>1</sup>We use the term immigration in this report to refer to all Latin Americans entering the continental United States. Since Puerto Rico is a commonwealth of the United States, technically Puerto Ricans are not immigrants but migrants. However the unique cultural and linguistic character of their Island makes their experience upon relocating to the continental U.S. quite similar to that of immigrants from other countries in Latin America. We therefore believe it is appropriate to speak of Puerto Ricans as immigrants in this context.

<sup>2</sup>Technically speaking, there is no stable "average" annual growth for any group, since the population will grow faster during the second half of a given decade than during the first half. The term "average annual growth" is used to provide the reader with a convenient basis for comparison, and is not intended for computational purposes.

## Comparative Growth of U.S. Population Subgroups •




Source: CTI projections from 1970 and 1980 Census data. Census sources include: 1980 Hispanic count — Report PC80-S1-7; 1970 Hispanic count — Supplementary Report, "Persons of Spanish Ancestry"; 1980 counts for total U.S. population, Whites and Blacks — Report PHC80-S1-1; 1970 counts for total U.S. population, Whites and Blacks — "United States Summary 1970."

## 1985-1990 POPULATION GROWTH PROJECTIONS: HISPANIC SUBGROUPS •

Percentages Denote Growth Rates Established Between 1970 and 1980.

Data Points and Corresponding Numbers Document Projected or Actual Populations at a Given Point in Time.



- Reported by the Hispanic Policy Development Project (1984)

\*The total Hispanic population grew by 6.1% per year from 1970 to 1980. From 1980 to 1990 the population is projected to increase by 6.8% per year.

Source: CTI projections of 1970 and 1980 Census data. Census sources include: 1970 counts — Supplementary Report, "Persons of Spanish Ancestry," and 1980 counts — Census Report PC80-S1-7.

as many Hispanics as Blacks in the U.S. by the late 1990's.<sup>3</sup>

California and Texas, both sharing a border with Mexico, are the states with the largest Hispanic populations, followed by New York, Florida, Illinois and New Jersey (see Exhibit 2). Massachusetts had the twelfth largest Latino population in 1980 (141,043) with the eighth highest growth rate. As migration patterns of Hispanics have shifted away from traditional areas of concentration such as New York City, Massachusetts has become an increasingly significant target of migration.

### Trends Within the State

The total population of Massachusetts declined by 3.4% over the 1970's while the principal minority groups (i.e. Blacks, Asians, and Hispanics) exhibited a growth rate of 50%. Thus, minority growth has offset White decline, leading to a greater statewide proportion of minority residents. The concurrent phenomena of White population decline and minority growth are particularly notable in urban areas.

While the Black population grew by 26% between 1970-80, and remained the largest of the minority groups, other minority populations increased at a faster rate. The Asian population grew by 55% but remained a small percentage of the total population. Hispanics, meanwhile, saw an astounding 113% increase in their numbers. This 11.3% average annual growth over the decade for Massachusetts was nearly double the already impressive national growth rate. Clearly, Massachusetts has become a special destination for Hispanic immigration.

In spite of its rapid growth, the total Hispanic population in Massachusetts in 1980 comprised only 2.5% of all state residents. The concentration of Hispanics in several key regional centers such as Springfield and

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<sup>3</sup>The accuracy of such predictions has been brought into question on several grounds, ranging from non-comparability of 1970 and 1980 methods of counting Hispanics, to inflation of the growth rate, or "phantom growth" brought about by better methods for enumerating Hispanics by the Census Bureau in 1980 (see Appendix A for a further discussion of Census methodology). Conversely, others have argued that this growth rate may be conservative, as Hispanics continue to be undercounted by the Census. Given these deficiencies in the Census data, unqualified projections should be treated with caution. There is little doubt, however, that the Hispanic population will continue to grow faster than other groups, and slowly approximate the size and relative demographic importance of the Black community by the late 1990s.

## GROWTH OF THE HISPANIC POPULATION BY STATE, 1970-1980

State	Increase/Decrease Hispanic Population, 1980			State	Hispanic Population, 1980			Increase/Decrease Hispanic Population
	Population	% Increase	Population		Population	% Increase	Population	
Alabama	33,299	-14.3%	-5,549	Montana	9,974	57.2%	3,630	
Alaska	9,507	105.6%	4,882	Nebraska	28,025	34.9%	7,257	
Arizona	440,701	66.3%	175,695	Nevada	53,879	162.8%	33,374	
Arkansas	17,904	-26.5%	-6,454	New Hampshire	5,587	144.9%	3,306	
California	4,544,331	91.8%	2,175,583	New Jersey	491,883	70.5%	203,395	
Colorado	339,717	50.6%	114,211	New Mexico	477,222	54.8%	168,882	
Connecticut	124,499	90.2%	59,031	New York	1,659,300	22.7%	306,998	
Delaware	9,661	14.0%	1,184	North Carolina	56,667	30.5%	13,253	
District of Columbia	17,679	17.0%	2,571	North Dakota	3,902	56.6%	1,410	
Florida	858,158	111.9%	453,121	Ohio	119,883	-7.8%	-10,113	
Georgia	61,260	35.3%	15,971	Oklahoma	57,419	12.0%	6,135	
Hawaii	71,263	186.6%	46,399	Oregon	65,847	194.8%	43,509	
Idaho	36,615	127.6%	20,529	Pennsylvania	153,961	41.4%	45,068	
Illinois	635,602	61.6%	242,255	Rhode Island	19,707	159.4%	12,111	
Indiana	87,047	-22.6%	-25,425	South Carolina	33,426	136.9%	19,315	
Iowa	25,536	21.8%	4,514	South Dakota	4,023	37.4%	1,094	
Kansas	63,339	16.9%	9,154	Tennessee	34,077	-31.3%	-15,511	
Kentucky	27,406	-38.8%	-17,352	Texas	2,985,824	62.2%	1,144,962	
Louisiana	99,134	40.5%	28,559	Utah	60,302	77.8%	26,391	
Maine	5,005	105.7%	2,572	Vermont	3,304	105.1%	1,693	
Maryland	64,746	42.4%	19,285	Virginia	79,868	98.6%	39,646	
Massachusetts	141,043	113.2%	74,897	Washington	120,016	109.2%	62,658	
Michigan	162,440	7.5%	11,370	West Virginia	12,707	44.7%	3,297	
Minnesota	32,123	-13.8%	-5,134	Wisconsin	62,972	0.1%	94	
Mississippi	24,731	56.4%	8,916	Wyoming	24,499	76.3%	10,605	
Missouri	51,653	-14.0%	-8,438					

Sources: CTI calculations based on census counts from "Supplementary Report, Persons of Spanish Ancestry, 1970" and Census Report PC80-S1-7. American Demographics Magazine Editors, *State Demographics: Population Profiles of the 50 States*. Dow Jones-Irwin, Homewood, Illinois.

● Reported by the Hispanic Policy Development Project (1984)

**Exhibit 3: Growth of the Massachusetts Hispanic Population  
by City/Town, 1970-1980**

CITIES/TOWN	1970	1980	Hispanic % Change 1970-1980	% Change in Total Pop 1970-1980	% Hispanic City/Town Population
Amherst	298	357	20	26.2	1.0
Attleboro	324	868	168	3.9	2.3
Boston	17,984	36,430	103	-12.2	6.4
Brockton	936	1,959	109	6.9	2.3
Brookline	637	1,162	74.2	-6.5	2.1
Cambridge	1,954	4,360	123	-5.0	4.8
Chelsea	1,098	3,602	228	-17.0	14.0
Chicopee	899	555	-38.2	-17.3	1.1
Everett	476	257	-46.0	-12.5	1.3
Fall River	220	2,349	968	14.5	2.4
Framingham	1,237	2,186	76.7	1.7	3.4
Holyoke	1,870	6,111	227	10.8	13.8
Lawrence	2,327	10,289	342	-5.6	16.3
Leominster	634	1,256	98.1	4.8	3.9
Lowell	1,079	4,536	320	-1.9	5.0
Lynn	953	2,083	119	-13.1	2.5
Malden	302	689	128	-4.9	1.0
Medford	437	400	-8.5	-9.8	0.7
New Bedford	1,144	4,598	302	-3.2	4.6
Newton	1,333	1,266	-5.0	-8.2	1.4
Peabody	537	662	23.3	-4.4	1.3
Pittsfield	272	248	-8.8	-8.8	0.5
Quincy	564	475	-15.8	-3.7	0.6
Revere	313	208	-33.5	-1.7	0.8
Salem	265	875	229	-5.8	2.0
Somerville	701	1,564	123	-12.8	2.8
Southbridge	305	780	155	-2.3	6.2
Springfield	5,456	13,917	155	-7.1	9.1
Taunton	502	1,350	169	2.8	2.9
Waltham	527	1,426	171	-5.5	2.2
Woburn	316	551	64.3	-2.1	1.6
Worcester	1,674	6,468	286	-8.4	4.3

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census

Lawrence, however, as well as in the state capital and its surrounding areas, gives this population greater impact than it might have if dispersed evenly throughout the state. The future of these important cities may well depend on the ease with which Hispanics can become integrated into the mainstream of their economic and political life.

Within Boston, the first Massachusetts city to have a large Hispanic community, Latinos continue to form a growing and vital presence in central neighborhoods such as Roxbury, Jamaica Plain, and North Dorchester, but there is also a trend toward growing concentration out of the central city. There has been a noticeable settlement outside of the Boston area and towards other Massachusetts cities. Arguably, it is outside of Boston that Hispanics are coming to have the greatest impact. In terms of numerical concentration, Lawrence has the proportionally largest Hispanic population, which comprised 16.3% of the city's inhabitants in 1980 (and an estimated 25-30% today). Other cities with over 5% Hispanic concentration in 1980 are: Boston, Chelsea, Holyoke, Southbridge and Springfield. Additionally, Cambridge, Fall River, Lowell, New Bedford and Worcester are some of the Massachusetts cities with rapidly growing Hispanic communities. As a result of this dispersion of the Hispanic population, Latinos now comprise the largest minority group in Massachusetts outside Boston (see Exhibit 3).

Our data on Hispanic population is really just a snapshot of a moving picture taken in 1980. If the current decade is comparable to the previous one, then we would anticipate a great deal of population change between 1980 and 1985, and additional change from 1985 through 1990. In order to convey a sense of the growing significance of the Hispanic population, we have calculated projections of statewide population by race for 1985 and 1990 (see Exhibit 4a). Of course, there is no magical formula for predicting population trends. At best, we look at past trends, consider any factors that might affect these trends, and make an educated guess about the future (see Appendix B for a more detailed discussion of this issue).

Given the provisos discussed in Appendix B, we are ready to explore our population estimates for Massachusetts. Exhibit 4a suggests several interesting points. First, population patterns to 1980 in Massachusetts show a stable overall population that changed by three-tenths of one percent over the 1970 to 1980 decade. Looking at the racial cohorts shows a different picture: while the White population across the state shrank by 3%, Blacks increased by one-fifth and Hispanics more than doubled. In fact, without Hispanic and Black population growth the total population of Massachusetts would have decreased by 1.7% (94,600 persons) instead of remaining stable. **Hispanics, 2.5% of the population of Massachusetts in 1980, accounted for 67% of all population growth.** Hispanic growth, then, has been a major

Exhibit 4(a): Massachusetts Population 1970-1990

GROUPS:	1970 Population (%)	1980 Population (%)	1970-80 Change (%)	1985 (e)* Population (%)	1990 (e)* Population (%)	1980-90 Estimated Change
White	5,477,624 (95.8)	5,305,963 (92.5)	-171,661 (-3.1)	5,223,721 (90.5)	5,141,478 (88.4)	-164,485
Black	175,817 ( 3.1)	212,608 ( 3.7)	+36,791 (+20.9)	234,826 ( 4.1)	257,043 ( 4.4)	+44,435
Hispanic	66,146 (1.2)	141,380 (2.5)	+75,234 (+113.7)	221,783 ( 3.8)	302,186 ( 5.2)	+160,806
Total Population	5,719,587	5,737,037**	+17,450 (+0.3)	5,774,790**	5,815,540**	+78,503 (+1.4%)

\* 1985 and 1990 are population projections; estimates of population and actual population figures are likely to differ by as much as 10% from these estimates.

\*\* Total population includes 74,086 persons who are neither White, Black, or Hispanic. In this sense, the 1980 Census is more accurate than the 1970 census. Our best sense is that this "other" population group (mostly Asian and Pacific Islanders, and Native Americans) is growing at an annualized rate of about 5.5%. This rate is used to estimate 1985 and 1990 total population.

Source: 1970 and 1980 Census data breakdowns, Lawrence Berkely Laboratory and Camayd-Freixas and Lopez, 1983. Differences in group counts (e.g., Hispanics 141,043 or 141,380) respond to progressive refinements by the Census Bureau in counting Hispanics in the White and Black categories.

**Exhibit 4(b): Hispanic Population in  
Massachusetts Cities: 1980-1985**

CITY (Ranked by Size)	1980 Popula- tion	1970-80 Growth (Rate) 1	Population Share (Rate) 2	1985 Population Estimate (%) 3
1 Boston	36,068	100.5% (14)	6.4% (4)	55,000 (9.8%)
2 Springfield (1985 maximum)	13,804	153% (8)	9.0% (4)	19,080 (12.5%) 24,360 (15.8%)
3 Lawrence (1985 maximum)	10,296	342.5% (2)	16.3% (1)	19,050 (26.4%) 27,800 (36.9%)
4 Worcester (1985 maximum)	6,877	310.8% (4)	4.3% (8)	12,220 (8%) 17,560 (11%)
5 Holyoke (1985 maximum)	6,165	229.7% (6)	13.8% (2)	9,700 (22%) 13,249 (28%)
6 Lowell (1985 maximum)	4,585	324.9% (3)	5% (5)	8,310 (8.9%) 12,036 (12.3%)
7 Cambridge (1985 maximum)	4,536	132.1% (9)	4.8% (6)	6,034 (6.6%) 7,532 (8.1%)
8 New Bedford (1985 maximum)	4,497	293.5% (5)	4.6% (7)	7,790 (7.9%) 11,085 (10.9%)
9 Fall River (1985 maximum)	2,187	894% (1)	2.4%	3,027 (3.4%) 5,468 (6%)
10 Framingham	3,186	76.7%	3.4%	
11 Brockton	2,142	128.8% (10)	2.3%	
12 Lynn (1985 maximum)	1,998	109.7%	2.3%	2,546 (3.6%) 3,094 (4.4%)
13 Somerville (1985 maximum)	1,530	118.3% (11)	2%	1,983 (2.9%) 2,435 (3.6%)
14 Waltham (1985 maximum)	1,417	167.9% (7)	2.4% (4)	2,012 (3.6%) 2,607 (4.6%)
15 Brookline	1,162	74.2%	2.1%	
16 Newton	1,147	-13.6%	1.4%	

Source: Same as Exhibit 4(a)

1. 1970 to 1980 percentage of Hispanic population growth in the city, and growth rate ranking by city.
2. 1980 Hispanic share of the total population by city, ranked by the size of the share of the Hispanic community by city.
3. Hispanic population by city estimated for 1985 and as a share of the total city population. Minimum estimated at 50% of Hispanic 1970-80 growth, maximum estimated at 100%; non-Hispanic population decline (conservatively) estimated by 1970-80 rate.

contributor to population stability in Massachusetts. This highlights the population patterns described in the following section, depicting a shrinking native-born population in the face of increasing Hispanic immigration and growth.

For 1985 our estimates show a Hispanic population of about 222,000, or 3.8% of the current expected population of Massachusetts. The Hispanic group is almost as large as the Black group. In fact, given that about 57% of all Blacks in Massachusetts live in Boston compared to only about 25% of all Hispanics, there are about 166,000 Hispanics in Massachusetts cities and towns outside of Boston as compared to about 101,000 Blacks. **That is, Hispanics are now the largest minority group in Massachusetts outside of Boston.** In Boston, however, Blacks outnumber Hispanics 2.4 to 1. By 1990, we expect the Massachusetts population to have grown to 5.8 million, 1.4% higher than in 1980. Given that the 1983 Current Population Survey of the Census Bureau showed a .5% increase from 1980 in Massachusetts to about 5,767,000 people, our 1980 to 1990 growth estimate for the state of 1.4% is well within expected bounds (see, for example, the Boston Globe, March 1, 1985)--perhaps a bit conservative. In 1990, then, our estimate is that the White population will have reduced to 88% of all state residents (down from 96% in 1970), the Black group will have increased to 4.4%, and Hispanics to 5.2%, becoming the largest minority group in Massachusetts; even then, Blacks would still outnumber Hispanics in Boston by about 2.1 to 1. In many ways, minority population is beneficial to Massachusetts. If the non-White population had remained unchanged since 1980, the population of Massachusetts would likely be 320,000 fewer people or 6% lower than expected by 1990, creating a series of economic hardships in the state. As it stands, a total decrease in the White population of about 164,000 people will likely be offset by an Hispanic increase of about 161,000 people during the decade, affording the state somewhat greater economic stability than would otherwise have been the case. Exhibit 4b ranks Massachusetts cities by the size of their Hispanic populations estimated for 1985, and serves to highlight these issues for some of our principal cities.

#### Why Are Hispanics Growing So Fast?

There are two primary reasons why Hispanics are becoming a growing presence in Massachusetts. The first is the high fertility rate of Hispanic women in the U.S. and in the state. The second is the continued pace of (im)migration both from outside the country and from other areas of the United States to Massachusetts.

**Fertility.** Fertility trends among Hispanics are the inverse of those of the U.S. population as a whole. First, overall U.S. fertility rates have been falling from the "baby boom"




Figure 1. Birth and fertility rates by Hispanic origin of mother. 7 selected States, 1978

## BIRTH RATES AND FERTILITY RATES: 22 REPORTING STATES, 1980

Ethnic group	Births per 1,000 population	Births per 1,000 women aged 15-44
All origins	16.4	70.2
White	14.2	62.4
Black	22.9	90.7
All Hispanic	23.5	95.4
Mexican American	26.6	111.3
Puerto Rican	20.3	77.0
Cuban	9.6	41.9
Other Hispanic	20.0	75.3

Sources: National Center for Health Statistics (1981).

Ventura, S. (1983). Births of Hispanic Parentage, 1980. *Monthly Vital Statistics Report*, 32 (6) (US Department of Health & Human Services, National Center for Health Statistics. Reported by the Ford Foundation (1984)

high of 3.8 children per woman in the 1950's, to 1.8 children per woman in 1976. This record low suggests that the U.S. is moving toward zero population growth, and little change in this trend is expected in the near future (Butz, McCarthy, Morrison and Viana, 1982). There are a number of explanations for these low birth rates, many of which are related. First the increased involvement of women in the workforce, which both prompted and reflected a changing perception of a woman's role in the family, may have caused some women to delay pregnancies. The increased availability, reliability, and acceptability of contraceptives has made it easier for women to plan and restrict their pregnancies. The recurring recessions of the past decade may also have discouraged some people from starting families, and may have kept family size small. **Due to these low birth rates, the number of U.S.-born young adults is continuing to decline, and will remain low throughout the twentieth century.**

Hispanic birth rates, on the other hand, show a very different trend (see Exhibit 5). **With an average of three to four children per family, the Hispanic population has a fertility rate almost identical to that of White women in the 1940s and 50s--the baby boom parents--and appears to be entering its own baby boom.** While in 1980, according to national statistics, 62.4 babies were born for every 1,000 White women aged 15-44, 95.4 babies were born for every 1,000 Hispanic women in the same age group. As Exhibit 5 shows, the highest birth rate is among Mexicans, who comprise only a small part of the Latino group on the East Coast. The most numerous Hispanic nationality groups in the East are Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and Cubans, and smaller numbers from Central and South America. Of these, only the Cuban group has a birth rate lower than the U.S. average, to a large extent because Cubans are the oldest Hispanic group, with a median age of 38, which places them beyond the peak child-bearing years.

A second consideration to add to fertility rates, suggested by the preceding Cuban example, is the average age of the population. Hispanics as a group are much younger than the overall U.S. population and are the youngest ethnic group in Massachusetts. Hispanic women as a group are now entering the peak child-bearing period of ages 19 to 29, whereas White women, on average, are beyond this peak. For example, Hispanic women in Massachusetts had a median age of 22 in 1980, whereas the median age of White women was 34. **White women as a group have had most of their children, whereas Hispanic women (with a higher birth rate) are now beginning to have theirs.**

Because Latino women are now entering the peak child-bearing years, and they will tend to have more children and at an earlier age than other groups, the Hispanic population will continue to be a young group for some time to come. The overall U.S. population, meanwhile, will continue to grow older on average. This pattern, as pervasive in

Massachusetts as it is nationwide, is clearly depicted in the age-sex pyramids for Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics in this country in 1980, shown in Exhibit 6. The Hispanic pyramid shows not only a greater proportion of their population below thirty, but also a pattern of larger age cohorts in the childhood years; by comparison both the White and Black groups have larger older cohorts, and shrinking cohorts in the earlier childhood years--this is particularly pronounced for the White group. The result of these patterns is likely to be a prolonged Hispanic baby boom, and comparatively greater Hispanic population growth in the face of decreasing White growth. The Latino community and its problems will hardly go away in future years.

Immigration. In addition to high birth rates, the Hispanic population will continue to be augmented by continuing Latin American (im)migration. Massachusetts attracts Hispanic immigrants and migrants at rates that are higher than for any other racial/ethnic groups. In cities such as Boston, Cambridge, Springfield, Lawrence and Holyoke, between one-quarter and one-half of the Hispanic population in 1980 had moved into the Commonwealth during the preceeding five years.


There are many factors that contribute to immigration, and much disagreement among experts over which are the most important. In this report we will briefly outline just a few. First, any economic expansion in the U.S. will create job opportunities that attract migrant workers. In light of the declining native-born population discussed above, it is expected that wages will increase and unemployment decrease in the U.S. as the economy expands, and the need for foreign-born workers to fill these jobs will become greater. In the past, employers have been known to actually recruit Latin American workers to fill low-wage jobs, preferring the costs of overseas recruitment (usually no more than airfare) to paying the higher wages necessary to attract native-born workers (Piore, 1983). Because immigration is an expensive and draining process, people who arrive here in times of economic expansion are unlikely to return to their country of origin during economic downturns.

However, immigration seems to continue even during recessionary periods in this country. How can we explain this? Some reasons have to do with imbalance in the world economy between developed and underdeveloped countries, the uneven exchange of goods and the conditions of economic dependency faced by the Third World, and population growth pressures in developing countries. Often economic conditions in developing countries are so bad that, in comparison, it still is preferable to come to this country and hope for the best. The economies of many Latin American countries have been made highly dependent on the U.S. economy; when things are bad here they are often worse there. As one U.N. diplomat recently put it, "When the U.S. sneezes, the Third World gets the flu."

## Age and Sex Distributions United States 1980

226,545,805  
Total U.S. Population\*

(In Percent)




Percent

14,608,673

Total U.S. Hispanic Population


(In Percent)



Percent

189,079,281  
Total U.S. White Population


(In Percent)



Percent

26,504,985  
Total U.S. Black Population

(In Percent)



Percent

Source: CTI calculations based on data acquired from U.S. Census Report PC80-S1-1.

Note: Due to rounding, a summation of the percentages of males and females for all age categories may not yield 100% exactly.

\*Note: The Hispanic population, those of Spanish origin as reported by the Census, are not considered for enumeration purposes to be a separate racial group. Hispanics are also included in the other groups according to their race. Because of the resultant duplication, the population figures for each of the subgroups cannot be added to yield total population.

A third stimulant of immigration is political instability in the country of origin, sometimes the unanticipated consequence of U.S. foreign policy. For example, the practices set in motion in Latin America by the Good Neighbor policy of the Roosevelt Era, and the collapse of former spheres of influence, led to massive migration of former client populations. The immigration of over three-quarters of a million Cuban refugees in the early 1960s, 125,000 more in the Mariel exodus of 1980, and of some 500,000 Indo-Chinese since 1975, must be understood in this context. Most recently, refugees from Central America have been arriving in this country in growing numbers. Since they are not accorded official refugee status by the Immigration and Naturalization Service they technically enter the country illegally; therefore it is impossible to know just how many Central Americans are here. It is likely, however, that their numbers will grow given the violence and instability in that area, and the U.S.'s continued political and military involvement.

Once immigration from a particular area to any part of this country has begun, it is likely to continue, in part encouraged by current immigration policy. Since 1965, U.S. policy has shifted away from admitting mostly skilled workers and has emphasized family reunification, enabling a legal resident to bring over his or her immediate family members. If we imagine that, following the patterns documented by most immigration experts, many immigrants come to the U.S. alone to seek work and then send for their families, we can see that the Hispanic population will likely increase simply as a function of family reunification. It should be recalled that Puerto Ricans, who are U.S. citizens, are not affected by immigration policy, although they do tend to follow the family reunification pattern.

There are many problems and benefits that come as a result of such immigration. Large waves of immigrants place an added strain on housing and labor markets, and often on human services and education as well. **Yet the net costs of immigration on the host country are not negative.** Immigrants, even undocumented workers, generally pay federal income and social security taxes while seldom collecting welfare, unemployment, or social security benefits. They are frequently less skilled than the native population and end up with the lowest-paying jobs, which often do not interest native workers. Often it is the very cheap immigrant labor which keeps marginally profitable industries, such as the garment industry, from going out of business or moving overseas. Clearly, both benefits and problems accrue from such mass movements of people.

**PART TWO**  
**POPULATION PROFILE**

This section describes the Hispanic community in Massachusetts. From these data we can draw some inferences about the problems Hispanics face, and can generate some ideas about policy areas in need of attention. The following areas are discussed: national origins, age distribution, education, language use, citizenship, employment, industrial and occupational characteristics, income and poverty, and political participation.

National Origins

The Hispanic population in the U.S. includes Latin Americans of diverse national origins, along with Spaniards. While nationally the majority of Hispanics are of Mexican origin, in the Northeast the composition of the population is different. In Massachusetts, as of 1980, 53% of Hispanics were of Puerto Rican origin, 5.5% were Mexican-American, 5% of Cuban extraction, and the balance of 36% fell into the ambiguous census category of "other Hispanic" which includes Dominicans, Central and South Americans, and Spaniards. In Massachusetts this category is dominated by immigrants from the Dominican Republic, Central America and Colombia. The earliest documentation of the existence of an Hispanic community in the Commonwealth dates back to the 1890's, when Jose Marti, leader of the War of Independence in Cuba and the Caribbean, visited Boston to meet with Cuban and Puerto Rican patriots to seek their support in the fight against colonial Spain. While holding in common a language, culture, and intertwined history, the different Hispanic nationalities in Massachusetts have experienced different immigration patterns. A brief profile of each group follows.

**Puerto Ricans.** Puerto Ricans represent the largest segment of the Commonwealth's Latino community. Older Puerto Rican communities were established in areas like New York City in the 1920's and 30's. In the 1940's and 1950's agricultural workers from the Island were sometimes brought into Massachusetts (e.g. Springfield, Holyoke) to do seasonal agricultural work, but there is little evidence that the permanent, urban communities that took root in the 1960's were outgrowths of this early, temporary migration. In the 1960's and 1970's, Puerto Ricans began settling in Boston and other Massachusetts cities, responding to the demand for low-wage industrial labor. The Boston area's educational resources have also attracted many middle-class Puerto Ricans in recent years. In the 1980's, Massachusetts has begun to experience an increasing migration of college-educated Puerto

Rican professionals seeking economic opportunity.

Puerto Ricans, the second largest Hispanic subgroup nationally, differ from other Hispanic subgroups in that they are U.S. citizens by birth. The island of Puerto Rico is a commonwealth, officially part of the United States but not itself a state. The political status of the Island is a source of conflict among Puerto Ricans, some of whom support the status quo while others advocate either independence or full statehood. The commonwealth status gives Puerto Ricans some of the obligations of citizenship without many of the rights: for instance, they have no representation in Congress and cannot vote in presidential elections, but can be drafted into the armed services and, in fact, served disproportionately and with distinction in the Korean and Vietnam Wars (Ford Foundation, 1984).

Because immigration laws do not affect Puerto Ricans' ability to move in and out of the continental U.S., migration patterns from the Island have often included return trips of varying duration. This is important to keep in mind, especially when considering the educational needs of Puerto Rican children. It is not unusual for many of these children to move between the Island and the continental U.S. at some point during their schooling, and therefore face the need to deal with the school systems of both cultures. Puerto Ricans also have large second generation communities (i.e., U.S.-born Puerto Ricans) that have also contributed to the Puerto Rican migration to Massachusetts, adding another dimension to the complex fabric of this young community.

**Dominicans.** Dominicans began arriving in the Northeast in large numbers in the mid-1960's; it was a time of political upheaval in their country and expanding labor demand in the United States. Depressed economic conditions in the Dominican Republic have promoted a continuing migration out of that country.

In earlier periods, Dominican migrants tended to move from the rural areas of the Republic to the capital of Santo Domingo, and then to the U.S. Today, it is far more common for people to move directly from the Dominican countryside to a U.S. city, where they compete for low-wage industrial and service positions. A second, parallel group of immigrants has included more skilled persons from urban areas seeking business and economic opportunities in the U.S. This smaller group of entrepreneurs has been rapidly developing a foothold in the small business sector of areas such as Lawrence, and is rapidly developing its own civic organizations. Dominican immigrants are often faced not only with the cultural and linguistic difference of North America but, like the Puerto Rican migrants of the 40's and 50's, also with the adjustment from rural to urban life. Many Dominicans keep close ties to the Republic, remaining involved in its political life and, like most Hispanic immigrants, intending to return there one

day. Unfortunately, little has been documented about the Dominican immigration to the United States. Perhaps because this migration is relatively new, or because it is so concentrated in the Northeast as to lose statistical significance in national data. The Census does not enumerate Dominicans as a separate group, and therefore it is difficult to get a precise picture of this important group. It is clear, however, that this group has been growing and concentrating in a few areas of the Commonwealth in particular (e.g., Lawrence).

**Cubans.** Cubans, often considered by the media as the most prosperous of the Hispanic subgroups, have mostly arrived in the U.S. and in Massachusetts during the last 25 years. They are the third largest Hispanic group in the U.S. The Cuban immigration to the U.S. dates back to the 19th century, when Cuban communities were established in areas like New York City and Tampa, Florida. The major exodus of Cubans to the U.S. followed the 1959 Cuban Revolution headed by Fidel Castro. About 800,000 Cubans immigrated during the 1960's and early 1970's, followed by an additional 125,000 in 1980 during the Mariel Port exodus. Conventional wisdom assumes Cubans to be middle class or wealthy, and to have migrated to the U.S. for political reasons. In reality, the character of the Cuban group has changed with each immigration wave. First, in the early 1960's came large segments of the upper and professional classes, disgruntled with the socialist Cuban Revolution. By the mid and late 1960's and during the 1970's, the character of the immigrant groups became progressively more working class and racially heterogeneous, and the Mariel exodus of 1980 brought a distinctly working class population. While the Cuban immigration has been socio-economically mixed, the disproportion of wealthier and professional groups in the early 1960's strongly biased the perception of the character of this group. In addition, the earlier middle class Cuban immigrants brought with them many of the skills necessary for success in the U.S. Coupled with special federal support programs, these skills led to the rapid development of a substantial social and business infrastructure in Florida, later extending to Puerto Rico and other communities in the U.S. The media and even articles in the social science literature often referred to this group as the "Golden Exile."

While the success of this segment of the Cuban community has been substantial, it has served to obscure the experiences of other larger sectors of the Cuban community, particularly those outside of southern Florida and Puerto Rico. As the Cuban immigration waves to the U.S. gradually changed in socio-economic character, their settlement patterns also changed, with the more working class, later arrivals settling in Northern cities like Union City and Elizabeth, New Jersey, New York City, and Boston. The character of the Cuban community in these areas and in Massachusetts is more working class and racially-mixed than

the national average. As such, it is not dissimilar to other Hispanic groups in Massachusetts. The reasons for migration of Massachusetts Cubans are also similar to that of other Hispanics, with about half citing economic opportunity as their primary motivator. Even then, Cubans, like Dominicans, are over-represented among small businesses in the Hispanic community. Cubans are also over-represented among Hispanic professionals in Massachusetts, particularly in the private sector, giving this community a somewhat larger visibility than their numbers warrant. For example, both Hispanic newspapers in Massachusetts are Cuban-owned.

**Mexicans.** Nationally, Mexicans are the largest Hispanic subgroup. The interrelationship between Mexicans and North Americans is rich and complex; in the Southwest, the Mexican influence is apparent everywhere. In Massachusetts, however, the Mexican population is small and mostly assimilated within the general population. Given the distance between the Commonwealth and Mexico, it is likely that those who have come to Massachusetts have done so to pursue careers or schooling, and not for low-wage employment.

**Central and South Americans.** Since these groups are included in the "other Hispanic" category of the census, there is a dearth of accurate information about them. Both nationally and statewide, these immigrants are as diverse as their countries of origin. While some are well-educated and have come to Massachusetts to pursue professional careers, others are poor and unskilled; many are fleeing political turmoil. Those familiar with this community report a recent increase in the number of immigrants from such conflict-ridden countries as El Salvador and Guatemala. The actual numbers are not known, although it is generally acknowledged that Central American refugee communities have been growing very rapidly, especially in areas like Cambridge and Somerville. Given the continued political unrest in Central America, this group of immigrants is likely to grow.

#### Age Distribution

The youthfulness of the Hispanic population has already been alluded to as a major factor contributing to continued population growth. The age distribution is important to policy makers and planners, and merits further consideration at this point. Throughout the state, the White population is growing increasingly older, compared to young Black and Hispanic groups. Thirty-eight percent of all Hispanics in 1980 were under the age of 16, compared to 22% of all Whites and 30% of all Blacks. At the other end of the continuum, 16% of Whites are 65 or older, compared to only 3% of Hispanics (see Exhibit 7).

EXHIBIT 7 Massachusetts population by age, sex and race/ethnic group, 1980






EXHIBIT 8

**Families with Own Children At Home**  
Universe = all families in each race/ethnic group



- Reported by the U.S. Department of Labor Employment and Training Administration 1980 Census. Run No. 83110 Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory

The difference between the age distribution of Hispanics and Whites is most apparent in urban areas, where young Hispanic families are growing quite rapidly. This becomes clear when we compare median ages for different population groups in the cities. In Holyoke, for example, the typical White person is 38 years old while the typical Hispanic is only 16. These differences are depicted in the shape of the age/gender pyramids in Exhibit 7.

The different age structures of these groups has several implications. First, a higher proportion of Hispanic women are presently in the peak childbearing ages, and a progressively higher proportion of adolescent Hispanic females will be entering the peak childbearing ages (19-29) over the next 15 years. Thus, Hispanic women as a group will have greater needs related to prenatal and other child related medical services, bilingual day care, and after school programs than any other segment of the Massachusetts population.

It follows that Hispanic families are far more likely to have children living at home than other families (see Exhibit 8). Not only do three-quarters of Hispanic families include children under 18 (as compared with under half the White families in 1980), but over 40% of Hispanic families, or twice the proportion of White families, include pre-school aged children.

Second, the relative youthfulness of the population results in a disproportionate representation of Hispanic children in the public and parochial school systems. While, at this point, the phenomenon is most striking in the elementary grades, it is rapidly extending into secondary schools. Issues of high drop out rates and low access to college will become pivotal concerns for Hispanics in coming years. In areas with large Hispanic communities, public school systems already have very high proportions of Latino youth. In Lawrence, where the population is about 25% Hispanic in 1985, 47% of all students are Latino; in Holyoke the schools are 40% Latino, in Chelsea 39%, and in Boston 17%.

Third, since today's youth comprise tomorrow's labor force, the education and welfare of this group is vital to the continued success of the state's economy. The interdependence of Latino youth and aging Whites can be understood most directly, if perhaps crudely, when we consider the fact that the viability of the social security system, which supports the elderly, depends on the contributions of younger workers. If young Hispanics are not being prepared for stable and decent employment, the ability of the younger generation to contribute to the support of the older will be affected.

The high proportion of youth in the Hispanic population

make issues affecting young people, such as education, school drop out, teen pregnancy, and youth delinquency, of particular concern to Latinos. The aging White population, on the other hand, may become more concerned with adult and elderly issues, and therefore more reluctant to support public expenditures for youth-oriented programs. The movement to reduce property taxes, which provide the revenue for public schools, may be an example of this. Unfortunately, issues affecting youth may come to be seen as "Hispanic" issues, rather than as concerns of the community at large. Policy makers should keep the interdependence of these two groups in mind when mediating conflicts over scarce public resources.

Finally, youth represent the potential for future growth. Hispanics, more so than other groups, will be in the early stages of family formation in the coming years, with all that that implies: establishing new households, initiating careers, buying and furnishing homes. Occupational training and job opportunities, credit and home ownership opportunities, and support for small businesses will all be important considerations for Hispanics. They are likely to become increasingly mobile, particularly from central cities to surrounding areas, as they gain some tenure in the labor force and a measure of social mobility. Young families beginning a family are likely to get involved in voluntary organizations relating to school or community issues. Thus, Hispanics will be an increasingly more integral part of many cities in Massachusetts throughout our lives.


### Educational Attainment

The significance of educational attainment for obtaining higher ranking occupations and greater earnings is well established. In recent years, education has perhaps become more important, as entry-level jobs now almost uniformly require a high school diploma, and professional and para-professional careers require a college degree and more. Even beyond the economic sphere, education is the tool that allows one to deal with an increasingly complex world. Voting, raising children, buying a house are all activities that can be essential to survival, and for which an adequate education is crucial. Those without education are at a disadvantage in this society, both in the world of work and beyond.

According to the 1980 Census, among the adult population (25 years or older), Hispanics have the lowest median educational attainment in Massachusetts (see Exhibit 9). Statewide, Hispanics have a median 10.9 years of schooling compared to 12.4 years for Blacks and 12.6 for Whites. The Boston area as a center of higher education, however, has unusually high proportions of college graduates, which

EXHIBIT 9

**Years of School Completed**  
 Universe = all persons 25 years and over in each race/ethnic group



- Reported by the U.S. Department of Labor Employment and Training Administration 1980 Census. Run NO. 831110 Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory

distorts the educational attainment figures for the Massachusetts Hispanic population. For example, in Massachusetts, 12% of Hispanics are college graduates--a rate higher than the national average of 7.7%. Yet, given the over concentration of professionals in the Boston area, this figure may prove misleading if used to characterize Hispanic communities across the state. The number of Hispanic professionals in cities and towns outside of Boston are often much lower than the 12% average for the state.

A more telling statistic is that 56% of Hispanic adults (25 years and over) in Massachusetts lacked a high school diploma in 1980, compared to 35% for Blacks, and 27% for Whites. In other words, 56% of Hispanic adults were school drop outs. More dramatic indicators are that in Lawrence, Holyoke, Worcester and Springfield, Hispanics have a median of about seven years of education--in other words, in these cities the typical Hispanic adult did not complete middle school. In Chelsea, Springfield, New Bedford, Westfield and Lawrence, at least one out of five Hispanics reported five years or less of formal education in 1980. These very low levels of formal education are poor predictors of success in the Massachusetts labor force for these segments of the Hispanic community. This is an "at-risk" population in need of focused adult training programs aimed at underserved occupations in the Massachusetts area.

### Housing

In 1980, the large majority of Hispanic households (78.2%) in Massachusetts resided in rental housing; this proportion of renters is higher than that of Blacks (73.4%) and substantially higher than that of White households (41.7%). Conversely, Hispanics had a much lower share of home owners (21.8%) than Blacks (26.6%) or Whites (58.3%). Hispanic households across the state also showed greater average household density for both owner-occupied and rental units (averaging 3.3 persons per household) than White (2.7) or Black households (2.8). This may be due, in part, to Hispanics' greater likelihood of living in a family setting (73% of households) than non-Hispanics (50% of households), and the fact that Hispanics tend to have larger families (see Exhibit 8). While groups with larger families also tend to have somewhat higher household density, it is often the case that extended Hispanic families live together in order to afford high rents and stay within the limits of their comparatively lower family income. Moreover, there is evidence that Hispanics often face discrimination in housing and may often be required to pay higher rents than Whites for comparable or inferior housing (see, for example, Frisby, 1985).

If we take the City of Lawrence as an example, we can

see two patterns of housing discrimination. On the one hand, Hispanics over-concentrate in four neighborhoods all located in one half of the City: Arlington (33% Hispanic in 1980), Arlington Extension (48.6% Hispanic in 1980), Lower Tower Hill (38.1% Hispanic in 1980), and Newbury Street (53.9% Hispanic in 1980). This depicts a strong pattern of housing segregation.

**Exhibit 10: Housing Discrimination Example:  
Lawrence 1980**

<u>Renters Only</u>	Typical Number of Rooms	Average Number in Household	Average # Value of Residence	Average # Monthly Rent
White	5 or 6	2	\$50-100,000	\$150-200
Hispanic	4	3 to 4	\$30-50,000	\$150-200

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Source: 1980 Census; Camayd-Freixas, et al., 1985.

The second pattern strongly suggests discrimination among renters (see Exhibit 10). As we can see in Exhibit 10, Hispanic renters in Lawrence have apartments 25% to 50% smaller compared to White renters. However, Hispanic renters have one-half to two times the number of persons in the household compared to White renters. Furthermore, Hispanic renters tend to rent residences of much lower value. Hispanic renters were required to pay the same rent as Whites for much smaller apartments in lower value residences. This pattern of discrimination results in higher Hispanic household density, given the fact that Hispanic families would likely be required to pay much higher rents than Whites if they sought to have the larger 5 or 6 room apartment, typical among White renters.

While this picture is bleak, the housing situation for Hispanics is likely to have deteriorated further since 1980. Two major culprits can be identified: the shortage of low and moderate income housing, and rapid gentrification. Although we have no hard data on these, typical patterns reported by our Housing Task Force suggest that Hispanics are bearing a disproportionate share of the impact of these problems. The availability of rental housing has fallen at or below 2% in many Massachusetts cities and towns such as Boston and Lawrence--less than 5% available rentals is considered critical. This shortage is pushing rental costs

very high, and many Hispanic families are reportedly doubling-up in order to afford the high rents. Another related problem is rapid gentrification in many areas like Boston, Chelsea, and Worcester. Gentrification pushes rents up and displaces neighborhood residents. Since Hispanics are the poorest group of all, they cannot compete effectively in the market and often become the first to be displaced. Hispanics are heavily overrepresented among those displaced from gentrifying neighborhoods. In Boston, for example, 1983 studies have found that about 1/3 of Hispanics in the Dudley Street area (the poorest area of the city) were displaced from gentrifying neighborhoods in the South End, Jamaica Plain, and Mission Hill. Since 1983, rental costs in the Dudley area have also skyrocketed.

Besides poor housing quality, crowded living conditions, and common housing discrimination, Hispanics in Massachusetts are frequently victims of arson for profit and many other ills attributable to housing disinvestment. Put simply, Hispanics generally live in the poorest neighborhoods, where arson is often a common problem. Hispanic renters experience many times the rate of arson for profit faced by other groups.

Contrasted to this bleak housing picture, we have already represented Hispanics as a group in the early stages of family formation (e.g. marriage, initiating new households, seeking home ownership, and establishing roots in their communities). The housing conditions faced by Hispanics are getting worse, and exist at a time when Hispanics are at their greatest need for fair and affordable housing. Furthermore, shabby and overcrowded housing, typical for large numbers of Hispanic children, can have a deleterious effect on the physical and emotional development of these children. Clearly, this is an area in great need of attention.

Policy initiatives should include: development and full implementation of a fair housing plan by cities with large Hispanic populations; development of a local housing court in these cities to address common complaints by tenants of landlord violations of the housing code and even of their civil rights; creation of tough anti-arson programs; creation of Hispanic community development corporations for the principal Hispanic neighborhoods to focus on home ownership programs, housing rehabilitation, programs for reclamation of abandoned properties, and development of new and affordable housing in neighborhoods of high Hispanic concentration; and development of plans to delimit condominium conversion that also make provisions for tenants displaced by any such process. Given the pattern of displacement already evident in Chelsea and other cities within the Boston SMSA facing similar conditions (e.g., a recent report by the National Planning Association lists the Boston-Lawrence-Salem area as the 10th leading area in the U.S. for development of new jobs between 1982-2000; a 1.27% annual increase in the number of new jobs is projected, or a total of 507,800 new jobs in this

area for the 18 year period), increasing demands for rental housing and gentrification are likely to develop. Hispanics, 78% tenants and with the lowest family income of any group in the Commonwealth, are likely to be most affected by any such changes.

### Language Usage

Spanish is the dominant language among Massachusetts Hispanics. Only 20% of Hispanics in 1980 reported English as the language not often used at home, while 80% speak Spanish at home. Of this 80% (or 99,174 persons over the age of four in 1980), 22% report their proficiency in English as "speak English poorly or not at all." Thus, the remaining three quarters of the population where Spanish is spoken in the home consider themselves to be at least somewhat proficient in English. In Massachusetts, areas with a preponderance of recent migrants, fewer people tend to speak English. For example, in Holyoke and Lawrence nearly one-third of those over four years old speak English poorly or not at all, and over one-fifth in the 14-24 age group had little English proficiency. Spanish language usage remains high because 37% of all Hispanics report being foreign-born. This figure does not include Puerto Ricans, the majority of whom have migrated here from the Island. Altogether, at least 75% of Hispanics in Massachusetts were born on Spanish-speaking soil, and most of the remainder are children of foreign-born parents.

The dominance of Spanish-speakers, particularly monolingual Spanish-speakers throughout the different age cohorts has several implications. First, low English proficiency amongst the young highlights the critical need for bilingual education. This is a very important consideration in Massachusetts, in light of the fact that bilingual education has recently come under increasing attacks by Secretary of Education William Bennett representing the Reagan Administration, by private groups such as English Only and even by Boston School Superintendent Laval Wilson and a group of Massachusetts school superintendents. Bilingual education is an essential need to Massachusetts' Hispanics seeking to join the social and economic mainstream, and is the main pathway for addressing these problems with the younger generation.

In the adult age groups, inability to speak English keeps many Hispanic workers both out of jobs and training programs. A combination of English training and bilingual job training is needed to overcome this barrier. Among the elderly, low English proficiency speaks to the need for Spanish language information and bilingual practitioners to serve this population. Overall, this pattern of language use argues in support of Hispanic bilingual/bicultural providers and programs in human services.

It may be expected that English language usage will

increase with length of residence. But, given rapid Hispanic growth, large segments of the community will be newcomers in future years. For the foreseeable future, institutions serving Hispanics will have to adapt to the language requirements of their clientele.

### Citizenship

There were 116,563 Hispanic U.S. citizens living in Massachusetts in 1980, representing 82.4% of all Hispanics. This is somewhat higher than the percentage of Hispanic U.S. citizens nationally (80%), in part, reflecting the preponderance of Puerto Ricans in the Commonwealth, but, also, large numbers of naturalized U.S. citizens among non-Puerto Ricans. Since 74,910 Massachusetts' Puerto Ricans in 1980 were citizens, they represented 64.3% of all Hispanics in this state who are U.S. citizens. The remaining 35.7% of U.S. citizens consist of 28,389 U.S. born, non-Puerto Rican Hispanics (24.3%), and 13,264 naturalized U.S. citizens (11.4%). According to these calculations, then, 62.6% of non-Puerto Rican Hispanics in Massachusetts are U.S. citizens. This figure is high and suggests that the Census may have undercounted Hispanics who are not U.S. citizens. Nonetheless, there is clearly a very large proportion of Hispanics in Massachusetts who are or will soon be eligible to vote, demonstrating the potential importance of Hispanic political participation in the Commonwealth.

### Residential Stability

In spite of the general perception that Hispanics are recent newcomers to Massachusetts, most Hispanics counted in the 1980 census (71.6%) were also residing here in 1975. Just over one-third had been living at the same address for at least five years, and one-third had changed addresses but lived in the same county. Only 5% have moved between counties within the state. The in-movers had come from overseas (16.3%) or from other parts of the continental U.S. (11.2%), primarily other Northeastern states.

These statistics paint a portrait of a population that continues to be augmented by (im)migration, but that is rapidly growing roots within the communities it inhabits. The most significant movement occurs within counties, suggesting that households are relocating frequently within the same community. This is not surprising, considering that 78% of Hispanic households do not own their homes, and, as poor renters, Hispanics are impacted by arson, disinvestment, harassment and discrimination, and exorbitant rent increases, and are often displaced from their home. Their propensity to stay within their communities can be seen as an indication of their growing roots in those communities.

## Employment

Although Latinos comprised 2.5% of the total 1980 population in Massachusetts, they comprised 1.8% of the civilian labor force and 1.7% of employed persons. In part, this lower representation in the labor force is due to the youthfulness of the Hispanic population. A larger proportion of Hispanics are school-aged, and a larger proportion of the Hispanic labor force is comprised of young people in their late teens who are less likely to be employed than their elders regardless of their race.

Beyond these demographic differences, Hispanic adults are less likely to be in the labor force as other groups but much more likely to be unemployed than the overall Massachusetts population.<sup>4</sup> Hispanic labor force participation in 1980 was 57.6%, compared to 64.8% for Whites and 62.5% for Blacks. Among women, labor force participation differed; 46% of Hispanic females were considered part of the labor force, compared to 56% for Black females and 54% for White females. Since caring for pre-school children has been found to be the strongest counter-predictor of whether minority women in Boston will seek employment (Camayd-Freixas and Amaro, 1985), much of this gender difference can be explained by the large number of Hispanic women (42%) with children under six.

Hispanic unemployment in 1980 was 9.6%, slightly higher than for Blacks (8.7%) and exactly twice that for Whites (4.8%). By 1984, Hispanic unemployment in Massachusetts had increased to over 3 times that of Whites (i.e., 16.4%, compared to 4.6% for Whites). Since nationally Hispanic unemployment is 60% higher than that of Whites, it appears that the White-Hispanic differential is more pronounced in Massachusetts than in many other states. As a matter of fact a recent study by the Division of Employment Security stated that "...Hispanics were much less likely to hold a job in Massachusetts than Hispanics throughout the nation. In fact, Hispanics were 11% less likely to hold a job in the state than in the nation due to both higher unemployment rates and

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<sup>4</sup>When looking at the employment profile of a community, it is important to understand how unemployment statistics are calculated. The official unemployment rate is not the percentage of residents who do not have work; it is the percentage of those in the labor force--made up of those over the age of 16 who have worked or looked for work in the preceding month--who are not working. There are therefore many people who are not working but also not counted among the unemployed (i.e. discouraged workers), because they have not looked for work during the preceding thirty days.

lower labor force participation rates. In short, Hispanics have not benefited from the economic expansion to the same extent as other demographic groups." This situation may be also due to the changing character of the economy and occupational distribution in Massachusetts, where many manufacturing jobs are giving way to high-level service industries. Hispanics are traditionally over-represented in manufacturing and blue collar occupations (i.e., laborers and machine operators), and may be bearing a disproportionate burden of the changing Massachusetts economy (see, for example, Camayd-Freixas and Amaro, 1985, for a discussion of this problem). The restructuring of the Massachusetts economy suggests the need to re-orient job training for Hispanics from old growth sectors to producer services and high-tech sectors, and to those areas of the service sector that promise employment stability and opportunities for advancement.

Unemployment generally decreases with increasing age. Hispanic teenagers (ages 16 to 19) in 1984 had an unemployment rate of 35.7%; .7 of a percentage point higher than that of Black teenagers, and almost four times higher than the overall unemployment rate of 9.6% for all teens. The unemployment rate in 1984 for adult Hispanics across the state was 16.4%. This is considerably higher than the unemployment rates attained by any other racial or ethnic group. Hispanics in general, and Hispanic youth in particular, are in a considerably more disadvantaged position in the Massachusetts labor market. To some extent this is due to limited English proficiency and lower levels of formal education, as well as to employer discrimination in hiring and promoting workers (National Commission for Employment Policy, 1982). This is a pivotal area deserving concentrated attention across the state. Training programs that assist Hispanic workers transfer or develop occupational skills more congruent with the Massachusetts economy should be prioritized.

Hispanics who participate in the labor force are unemployed more often than Whites and Blacks and for longer periods of time. Exhibit 11 shows that, of Hispanics who worked in 1979, only 58.2% of the men and 46.0% of the women worked for the full year; nearly one-fifth of the men and 28.1% of the women worked for 26 weeks or less. It is notable, for instance, that in Cambridge, where Hispanic unemployment is low, 56.1% of the working men and 66.2% of the women were employed for less than the full year. Thus, most of those Hispanics counted among the employed could expect one or more periods of unemployment in a given year. Hispanics who had been unemployed during the year were more likely than Whites and less likely than Blacks to be out of work for long periods. This rough sketch portrays a pattern of frequent, relatively short periods of joblessness for Hispanic workers, and is characteristic of the non-durable goods manufacturing, low-level service and secondary-sector industries in which Hispanics are concentrated. This

**Exhibit 11: JOB STABILITY INDICATORS, 1979**

Number of Weeks Worked	TOTAL	WHITE	BLACK	HISPANIC
Men who have worked in the past year:				
50 to 52 weeks	68.2	68.7	61.7	58.2
26 weeks or less	14.2	13.9	18.4	19.8
Women who have worked in the past year:				
50 to 52 weeks	53.3	53.5	54.6	46.0
26 weeks or less	22.1	22.0	22.6	28.1
Number of Weeks Unemployed	TOTAL	WHITE	BLACK	HISPANIC
Men who have been unemployed in the past year:				
1 to 4 weeks	26.3	26.2	23.6	28.3
15 weeks or more	38.3	31.1	42.8	29.1
Women who have been unemployed in the past year:				
1 to 4 weeks	34.8	35.1	31.9	33.7
15 weeks or more	30.5	30.1	36.2	33.9

Source: 1980 Census; U.S. Department of Labor, Run 831110.

**Exhibit 12a: Industrial Distribution of Hispanic Workers  
in Massachusetts, 1980**

Industry	Employees	(%)
Manufacturing	18,584	(41.3)
Nondurable	8,699	(19.3)
Durable	9,885	(22.0)
Transportation	1,220	(2.7)
Wholesale	975	(2.2)
Retail	4,461	(9.9)
Finance, etc.	1,975	(4.4)
Services	13,576	(30.2)
Public Admin.	2,079	(4.6)

**Exhibit 12b: Comparisons of Occupational Level by Race:  
Massachusetts, 1980**

	White	Black	Hispanic
White Collar	58%	50%	38%
Blue Collar	28%	27%	45%
Service Workers	13%	23%	16%

Source: 1980 Census; U.S. Department of Labor, Run 831110.

overconcentration in the secondary sector economy makes Hispanics more vulnerable to repeated bouts of unemployment, interferes with building tenure in the workplace, contributes to their underemployment and lower income, and tends to keep Hispanics less buffered against economically-difficult periods and more at risk of poverty. The overconcentration of Hispanics in the secondary sector of the economy threatens to make Hispanics a permanent underclass in Massachusetts. Relevant state departments should jointly develop a policy task force on Hispanic employment and economic well-being.

### Industrial and Occupational Distribution

The industrial and occupational structure of Hispanics in Massachusetts follows some predictable patterns (see Exhibit 12): Hispanics are concentrated in blue collar jobs. One-quarter are machine operators, assemblers and inspectors, and the remainder are divided between service occupations (e.g. food preparers or janitors), laborers, administrative support work and, to a much lesser extent, professional occupations, and craft production. Of all workers, Hispanics are least likely to be in high level occupations and most likely to be over-represented among service occupations, machine operators, and un/semi-skilled laborers (see Exhibit 12c); less than 3% are technicians, only 5% are in management. By comparison, Whites are over-represented among executives, professionals, sales occupations and precision production workers, while Blacks are over-represented among service workers and somewhat so among administrative support and clerical and machine operators.

Many Hispanic workers (41%) are concentrated in the manufacturing sector; an area of the Massachusetts economy that is shrinking or experiencing limited growth. Within manufacturing firms, they are likely to hold the least skilled and lowest paid shop floor positions. Those who hold service jobs (30%) are generally found working in hospitals, schools and hotels, frequently performing janitorial work. Most Hispanics, then, are employed in low-wage positions, many in unstable industries. Average earnings in some of these areas are not much higher than the minimum wage. In Massachusetts, a one-wage household working full-time at minimum wage or thereabouts will earn substantially below the poverty line. Given the overconcentration of Hispanics in manufacturing and certain other occupations in Massachusetts, it is important to analyze the relationship between organized labor and Hispanic workers.

While employment policy usually centers around affirmative action and training, there are other areas requiring attention as well. First, the above employment patterns suggest that many Hispanics work and will continue to work in low-wage jobs with few benefits and little security. Laws that protect workers and ensure an adequate minimum wage are therefore very important to the Hispanic

**Exhibit 12c: Massachusetts: Occupations of Persons Employed in 1980 (Persons aged 16 years or older)**

	TOTAL	WHITE	BLACK	ASIAN	HISPANIC
ALL OCCUPATIONS	2,674,275	2,514,532	81,864	23,082	44,982
	Column %	94 %	3.1%	0.9%	1.7%
Executives	292,009 10.9%	280,111 (95.9%)	6,367 (2.2%)	2,513 (0.9%)	2,328 (0.8%)
Professionals	408,375 15.3%	387,083 (94.8%)	9,509 (2.3%)	5,664 (1.4%)	4,935 (1.2%)
Technicians	96,708 3.6%	90,152 (93.2%)	3,054 (3.2%)	2,013 (2.1%)	1,173 (1.2%)
Sales	244,566 9.1%	236,859 (96.8%)	4,054 (1.7%)	1,199 (0.5%)	2,056 (0.8%)
Administrative Support	500,969 18.7%	472,269 (94.3%)	17,896 (3.6%)	2,803 (0.6%)	6,460 (1.4%)
Service	357,128 13.4%	325,281 (91.1%)	18,417 (5.2%)	4,412 (1.2%)	7,137 (2.0%)
Precision Production	303,882 11.4%	290,145 (95.5%)	6,996 (2.3%)	984 (0.3%)	4,670 (1.5%)
Machine Operators	267,610 10.0%	241,481 (90.2%)	9,701 (3.6%)	2,992 (1.1%)	11,832 (4.4%)
Transportation	86,055 3.2%	81,257 (94.4%)	2,817 (3.3%)	155 (0.2%)	1,394 (1.6%)
Laborers	93,613 3.5%	87,547 (93.5%)	2,749 (2.9%)	308 (0.3%)	2,459 (2.6%)
Population Aged 16 years and over	4,460,209 (100%)	166,327 (93.41%)	149,188 (3.34%)	38,509 (0.86%)	88,148 (1.98%)

Source: 1980 Census; U.S. Department of Labor, Run. 831110.

**workforce, but still likely to leave Hispanics in poverty.** The cooperation of private sector employers must be engaged in order to bring Hispanics into entry-level jobs, with an advancement ladder, particularly those which may require little English. A good case in point may be the skills already possessed by Hispanics working in the garment and similar older manufacturing industries, which may easily be transferred to high-tech production. Furthermore, a great deal of research is necessary to understand Hispanic patterns of occupational entry, concentration and mobility in Massachusetts, and to begin to identify ways of assisting this population to join the occupational mainstream of the communities where they reside.


### Income and Poverty

In spite of the fact that labor force participation rates are similar, the disparity between Hispanic and White income is quite dramatic. Across the U.S., Hispanic household income in 1980 is generally 70% of non-Hispanic income. In Massachusetts, the median household income reported by the 1980 Census was \$17,575 while that of Hispanics was \$10,064. In other words, Hispanic household income in 1980 was only 56% of non-Hispanic household income, much lower than the national average. **The typical Hispanic in Massachusetts earned 56 cents for every dollar earned by a White worker and 88 cents per dollar earned by Black workers.** The household income distribution for Hispanics is very skewed (see Exhibit 13), with a large group of families in the \$2,500 to \$4,999 category; only 8% earned over \$30,000 a year. White income, in comparison, is fairly evenly distributed across income categories, with 21.6% earning over \$30,000.

A dramatic outcome of such low Hispanic incomes is the disproportionate number of Latino households under the poverty level (see Exhibit 14). While Hispanics comprised 2.5% of the total population in 1980, they accounted for 10% of all individuals living in poverty. Thirty-six percent of all Hispanic families were below poverty level, compared to 6% of all White families and 23% of Black families. **Although Hispanics were six times more likely to be poor than Whites in 1980, they were only 2.4 times as likely to be receiving public assistance.** Clearly, then, Hispanics are under-represented among welfare recipients relative to their need. Many eligible Hispanic families may not be receiving the assistance to which they are entitled. A major public educational effort should be launched by the Department of Public Welfare to inform Hispanic families of their eligibility for benefits.



Of even greater concern is the fate of families headed by women with no male present. Female-headed families in 1980 accounted for 36% of all Hispanic households in Massachusetts. Generally, female-headed households account

EXHIBIT 13 Household income distributions by race/ethnic group, Massachusetts




**Racial Composition of Persons In Poverty**  
Universe = 532,458 persons with 1979 income below poverty (I)


**Age Composition of Persons In Poverty**  
Universe = 532,458 persons with 1979 income below poverty (I)



**Persons Below Poverty Level**  
Universe = persons in each race/ethnic group except dorms, etc (I)



**Families Below Poverty Level**  
Universe = total families in each race/ethnic group



• Reported by the U.S. Department of Labor Employment and Training Administration 1980 Census.  
Run No. 831110 Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory

for a large share of all poor families, but their impact differs across racial and ethnic groups. Across the state, White female-headed households had 1980 incomes that were 67% of White two-parent households; a similar pattern is evident among Black female-headed households, which had incomes 64% of Black two-parent households. Yet, in the case of Hispanics, female-headed households had incomes of only 49% of the income of Hispanic two-parent households. The absolute household income level of female-headed families also differed across the state, showing a median of \$11,800 for Whites, \$7,659 for Blacks, and an extremely low \$4,904 for Hispanics. Hispanic female-headed households earned 42 cents for every dollar earned by White female-headed households, and 64 cents per dollar earned by Black female-headed households. The typical Hispanic female-headed household took home about \$400 per month in 1980 to cover rent, utilities, food and clothing for four family members. Clearly, Hispanic female-headed households are at extreme risk, judging from such unmanageably low income.



Yet, these poverty figures are all from the 1980 Census. Since that time, cuts in federal spending and domestic programs (see Appendix C) have forced many families below the poverty line. Considering these national trends, we must assume that poverty data for Hispanics in Massachusetts derived from the 1980 Census are quite conservative.

### Political Participation

Although popular political wisdom assumes that Hispanics do not participate in the electoral process, there is evidence that this perception is generally exaggerated. Moreover, Latino electoral momentum has clearly been building since the early 1980's, leading to a rapidly growing Hispanic vote in Boston and Massachusetts, particularly around the Dukakis-King, Flynn-King, and Kerry-Shamie races. Besides classic support for the liberal wing of the Democratic Party, all of these campaigns broke ground by having fully active Latino teams and often paid staff working in one or both camps, and in bringing candidates into contact with the Latino electorate in a somewhat systematic way. Direct attention by candidates, and bringing local issues to the table, have proven a great stimulus to Hispanic electoral activism. This, in turn, has increased the visibility and relative importance of this constituency to more realistic levels, which is likely to promote increased attention by candidates in the future.


Although the Hispanic population in the state is not large (3.8% in 1985), it is growing and maturing rapidly (in the face of a slight overall population decline), and it is concentrated in a handful of major cities. Exhibit 4 presented population data for the state, estimated to 1985 and 1990. As is readily evident, there are a roughly comparable number of Hispanics and Blacks in Massachusetts

## HISPANIC POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: US 1972-1982


Proportion Eligible To Vote:  
Hispanic Population: 1980Proportion Eligible to Vote:  
Total Population: 1980

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of the Population, Detailed Population Characteristics, Series PC80-1-D, U.S. Summary

## Registration by Ethnic Group: 1972-1982



## Hispanic Registration and Voting by Sex: 1972-1982




Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-20  
 No. 250 Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1972  
 No. 293 Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1974  
 No. 322 Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1976  
 No. 344 Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1978  
 No. 370 Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1980  
 No. 383 Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1982

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-20  
 No. 250 Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1972  
 No. 293 Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1974  
 No. 322 Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1976  
 No. 344 Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1978  
 No. 370 Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1980  
 No. 383 Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1982


## HISPANIC POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: Turnout by socio-economic status

## Turnout of Registered Voters: 1972-1982




Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 250, *Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1972*; No. 293, *Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1974*; No. 322, *Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1976*; No. 344, *Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1978*; No. 370, *Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1980*; No. 395, *Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1982*.

## HISPANIC VOTING BY SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS IN 1980



Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 370, *Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1980*.

## Party Identification by Race and Hispanic Origin: November 2, 1982



Reported by the Hispanic Policy Development Project (1984)

Source: NBC/AP Election Day Voter Polls, November 2, 1982.

Anglo refers to persons who are not Hispanic, Black, or other racial minorities.

today (about 222,000 Hispanics), and Hispanics are growing at an accelerated pace. Given the fact that 57% of Blacks live in Boston as compared to only 25% of Hispanics, Latinos already outnumber Blacks outside of Boston about 1.6 to 1. Naturally, the young statewide Latino community does not have the level of political organization and expertise already achieved by the Black community. Nevertheless, the Latino vote is already a significant block in Massachusetts.

Of the estimated 222,000 Hispanics statewide in 1985, 82.5% are U.S. citizens (U.S. 80%, Boston 77%, Lawrence 75%). In addition, although Hispanics are young as a group, about 56% in Massachusetts are 18 years of age or older (U.S. average is 61.4%). In all, then, if we assume that 82.5% are U.S. citizens and 56% are 18 or older, we should have about 102,000 eligible Hispanic voters statewide in 1985. However, registration rates and voter turnout lag behind that, although their proportions will likely grow rapidly in the coming years as the population roots and matures in age. Currently, we have no idea of the number of registered Hispanic voters across the state, or of actual turnout rates of registered voters. We do have national figures, which are presented in Exhibits 15 and 16. It is important to note in Exhibit 16 that Hispanic voting is directly related to professionals, and that those with incomes at or above \$25,000 in 1980 were most likely to vote.

The two exhibits show data for the U.S. as a whole up to 1982. Naturally, the Hispanic registration rate (52% in 1982) is only slightly over 3/4 of the White registration rate (68%). Hispanic turnout (72%), on the other hand, is almost equal to White turnout (76% in 1982). These figures are summarized in Exhibit 17.

**Exhibit 17: U.S. 1982: Registration and Voting by Ethnic Group**

Group	Registration	Vote
Whites	68%	75%
Blacks	61%	73%
Hispanics	52%	72%

According to the figures in Exhibit 17, once registered, Hispanics tend to vote at about the same rate as everyone else, but only 37.44% of eligible Hispanics nationally are likely to vote. In Boston, this rate was slightly higher (over 40%) in the last presidential and mayoral elections. If we take the lower national figure (37.44%), we can expect that about 38,000 Hispanics are likely to vote in

Massachusetts elections today. Many of these votes are likely to go to the Democratic Party. Nationally, Hispanics are 9% Republican, 65% Democrats, and 26% Independent, undecided or other. In Massachusetts, Hispanics are overwhelmingly liberal Democrats. The outcomes presented in Exhibit 18 suggest that (1) Hispanics in Massachusetts vote overwhelmingly for liberal Democrats, and (2) that they tend to vote as a block much more than the national group.

Clearly, the potential for electoral and civic participation is an Hispanic asset that must be developed in Massachusetts. Involvement in the political process is also an important way in which Hispanic needs and an Hispanic political agenda can develop. Several areas of action are important. First, voter registration campaigns must be developed to bring the electoral role to Hispanics in their homes, community centers and commercial areas. Liberal election laws such as the currently proposed mail-in registration should minimize the barriers that Hispanics face and assist in increasing their levels of voter registration. Of particular importance is to include Hispanics in local election commissions across the state. Often, lack of Hispanic representation in these commissions inhibit the development of techniques to facilitate registration or the availability of persons empowered to register Hispanics to vote.

A second consideration is Hispanic participation in civic activities. To facilitate this process, local and state organizations should incorporate Hispanics into their boards and encourage Latino representation in city-wide institutions. This will enable these organizations to be more responsive to the Hispanic community, and will also assist in the development of local Hispanic leadership. The incubation of such leadership is, after all, an important element in community capacity-building and community development.

#### Exhibit 18: 1984 Boston Latino Vote

Candidate	Boston Average	Latino Vote
Mondale-Ferraro	64%	85%
John Kerry	67%	86%

Source: Camayd-Freixas, 1985 (Memorandum on the Latino Vote)

## Appendix A

Because of changes in Census methodology, the data from 1970 and 1980 are not completely compatible. In 1970 all respondents were asked to categorize themselves either as Black, White or other race. A smaller sample was also asked whether they were from Spanish-speaking households ("Spanish Language"). Therefore, in the 1970 figures we have an estimate of the Hispanic population (2,327), but Hispanics are also counted in the Black, White and other categories. Hence the discrepancy between the subtotals and total.

In 1980, the Hispanic category was defined as "Spanish Origin", and this category was considered a separate race. We are thus able to identify a Hispanic population apart from the White, Black and other groups, with no double counting. So, when we compare data from 1970 to data from 1980, we must remember:

--The 2,327 Hispanics counted in the 1970 Census are also distributed between the other three groups (looking at the figures, it seems they are predominantly categorized as White). The dramatic drop in the White population over the decade is slightly overstated, since some 1,000 to 2,000 of the 1970 White group were actually Hispanic, and were not counted as White in 1980.

--Because Hispanics were identified by "Spanish Language" in 1970 and "Spanish Origin" in 1980, it is possible that some Hispanics were missed in 1970 but counted in 1980. Generally, it is assumed that the 1980 Census was more accurate in counting Hispanics, which would slightly overstate the 1970-1980 Hispanic population increase.

In both cases, there is the possibility of an undercount of Hispanics. Undocumented immigrants are unlikely to respond to the Census, and even legal immigrants may mistrust its purpose. Illiteracy and transience also hamper efforts to count Hispanics.

## Appendix B

The technique used to arrive at these estimates is a simple mathematical linear extrapolation by cohorts, premised on the case period of 1970-1980. This technique assumes that historical trends provide a relatively reliable indication of future trends for each race cohort in the state. While there are several population projection techniques (e.g., mathematical extrapolation, ratio, cohort component, and economic-demographic modeling), research shows them to be very similar in their accuracy when projecting population, and there is no evidence that more sophisticated techniques yield more accurate forecasts (Smith, 1984). There are, however, several elements which effect precision (Smith, 1984). First, a large population leads to a smaller chance of error. This suggests that our estimates for the total population and for the White population are going to be more accurate than for the Black or Hispanic cohorts. A second effect is that projection techniques have tended to underproject the size of the population. A third consideration is that projection errors tend to be higher in rapidly growing areas. Massachusetts, with what may be a relatively stable total population from 1980 to 1990, is likely to yield smaller projection errors than those for the Hispanic cohort estimates, given the latter's rapid expected growth during the period being projected. Fourth, errors tend to be smaller when the projection horizon is smaller; that is, a smaller error is expected in a five than a ten-year projection, or in a ten than a twenty-year projection. Our estimates for 1985, based on the 1970-1980 censuses, then, are likely to be more accurate than our 1990 estimates. Finally, a review of seven projection techniques to estimate the population of states showed errors ranging from 7 to 9%. It is reasonable to expect, therefore, that our estimates will fall somewhere within 10% of what the actual population will be in 1990.

## Appendix C

Cuts in federal spending on domestic programs (see Exhibit 19) have forced more people below the poverty level (see Exhibit 20). Hispanics across the U.S. and in Massachusetts, who are overrepresented among the lower 20% of household income in the U.S., have been adversely affected by these cuts. Nationally, even before the recent federal cuts of 1985, there were 600,000 more Hispanic children under six living in poverty in 1983 than there had been in 1980 at the beginning of the current administration; thus bringing the percentage of Hispanic children under six living in poverty up to 41.8%, and to 38% of all Hispanic children--more than double the percentage of poor White children (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 1984). Overall, 22% more Hispanics lived in poverty in 1983 than in 1980, so that 28.4% (4.15 million) of all Hispanics, adults and children, were at or below the poverty level in 1983, as compared to 12% of Whites. The economic recovery of 1982-1983 did not reduce the percentage of Hispanics living in poverty. Rather, cuts in social support programs and growing unemployment increased the rate at which Hispanics become poor; since 1980 Hispanics are more than twice as likely to have become poor than other Americans (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 1984). Considering these national trends, we must assume that the poverty figures for Hispanics in Massachusetts from the 1980 Census are quite conservative.

**SPENDING REDUCTIONS IN FISCAL YEAR 1985  
UNDER ADMINISTRATION PROPOSALS COMPARED WITH  
REDUCTIONS SUBSEQUENTLY ENACTED BY CONGRESS**

Program	Percentage Reduction Proposed	Percentage Reduction Enacted*
<b>Low Income Benefit Programs</b>		
Food Stamps	-51.7	-13.8
Child Nutrition	-46.0	-28.0
Women, Infants, and Children (WIC)	-63.6	+9.1
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)	-28.6	-14.3
Supplemental Security Income (SSI)**	-2.5	+8.6
Housing Assistance***	-19.5	-11.4
Low Income Energy Assistance	-37.5	-8.3
Medicaid	-15.7	-2.8
Financial Aid for Needy Students	-68.9	-15.6
<b>Low Income Jobs and Services Programs</b>		
Health Block Grants and Other Health Services	-44.4	-33.3
Compensatory Education	-61.0	-19.5
Social Services Block Grant	-41.2	-23.5
Community Services Block Grant	-100.0	-37.1
General Job Training Programs	-43.9	-38.6
Public Service Employment	-100.0	-100.0
Work Incentive Program	-100.0	-33.1
Job Corps Program	-42.9	-7.7
<b>Other Programs of Interest</b>		
Social Security	-10.4	-4.6
Unemployment Insurance	-19.1	-17.4
Guaranteed Student Loans	-22.0	-39.0

Source: John L. Palmer and Isabel V. Sawhill, eds., *The Reagan Record: An Assessment of America's Changing Domestic Priorities*, The Urban Institute, August 1984, pp. 185-186. The Urban Institute based the figures in the chart on official budget data from the White House Office of Management and Budget and the Congressional Budget Office. The figures reflect the percentage reductions that would be in effect in fiscal year 1985 if all Administration budget proposals made since January 1981 had been enacted.

\*In a few instances, the figures shown under "Percentage Change Enacted" differ slightly from figures used elsewhere in this report. This is because the figures used in this report generally reflect reductions for FY 1984 while the Urban Institute computed reductions for FY 1985 and also because of some technical refinements made by the Urban Institute.

\*\*Although the table shows an 8.6 percent increase in the SSI program, most of this increase did not actually improve the income status of elderly and disabled SSI recipients. Rather, the SSI increase was designed to offset the loss of income that most SSI recipients would otherwise have suffered when Social Security cost-of-living adjustments were postponed last year.

\*\*\*The 11.4 percent reduction in housing assistance enacted is somewhat misleading: the Administration actually succeeded in securing a reduction of over 60 percent in new appropriations for low income housing. However, because housing appropriations are expended over a multi-year period, only an 11.4 percent expenditure reduction shows up in FY 1985. (A significant share of the housing expenditures in FY 1985 consists of funds appropriated before the Reagan Administration took office). In later years, larger expenditure reductions in low income housing, stemming from the recent budget cuts, will show up more fully.

Reported by the Center on Budget & Policy Priorities (1984)

## FAMILY INCOME

## Income Distribution of American Families in 1983


Population Category	% of Total National Income Received	Comparison to Past Percentages
Poorest two-fifths of all families	15.8%	Lowest percentage since the Census Bureau began gathering this information in 1947.
Middle fifth of all families	17.1%	Ties with 1982 for lowest percentage since 1947.
Wealthiest two-fifths of all families	67.1%	Highest percentage since 1947.
100.0%		

Note: The percentage of national income going to the poorest fifth is 4.7 percent. The percentage going to the wealthiest fifth is 42.7 percent, or nine times as much.

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Money Income and Poverty Status of Families and Persons in the United States: 1983*, August 2, 1984.

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## PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN REAL DISPOSABLE INCOME FOR FAMILIES, 1980-1984



Source: The Urban Institute (*The Reagan Record: An Assessment of America's Changing Domestic Priorities*, p. 321.)





